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The termination of a representative financial firm due to excessive leverage may lead to substantial
bankruptcy costs. A government in the tradition of Ramsey (1927) may be inclined to provide transfers
to the firm so as to prevent its liquidation and the associated deadweight costs. It is shown that the
optimal taxation policy to finance such transfers exhibits countercyclicality and history dependence,
even in a complete market. These results are in contrast with pre-existing literature on optimal fiscal
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During the recent ﬁnancial crisis, several ﬁnancial corporations received public-sector as-
sistance. The usual reason given for such “bailouts”, as they are commonly called in the
popular press, is that massive liquidations would have severe adverse eﬀects on the economy.
Predictably, such bailouts cause a lot of debate and questions as to their desirability. The
present paper does not seek to resolve this debate. Instead, it studies a more focused question.
Using a neoclassical framework in the tradition of Ramsey (1927), and simply assuming that
private-sector contracting frictions induce governmental intervention to avoid bankruptcy-
related deadweight costs, it studies optimal (distortionary) taxation to ﬁnance the transfer
payments needed to salvage the ﬁnancial ﬁrms. In the model a welfare-maximizing govern-
ment adjusts tax rates, anticipating the eﬀects of tax changes on equilibrium allocations,
and ultimately consumer welfare. There are two types of (competitive) ﬁrms. Financial
ﬁrms supply ﬁnancial services using capital. Final goods ﬁrms produce consumption goods
using labor and the services of ﬁnancial ﬁrms as inputs. Financial ﬁrms are partly ﬁnanced
by debt. If the ﬁrm’s assets fall short of its liabilities, then the ﬁnancial ﬁrm must be liqui-
dated. Liquidation leads to deadweight costs, which can induce the government to provide
the ﬁnancial ﬁrm with capital injections in order to prevent its liquidation and the associated
deadweight losses.
In the baseline model, the transfer payments are ﬁnanced by distortionary labor taxes
similar to Lucas and Stokey (1983), and markets are (dynamically) complete. Because
taxation is distortionary, Ricardian equivalence fails and the optimal welfare-maximizing
way to raise taxes becomes a non-trivial problem.
A new feature of the model is that taxes are not raised to ﬁnance exogenous government
expenditures, but rather to ﬁnance transfer payments from the government to the ﬁnancial
ﬁrm. Hence, government outlays do not drive a wedge between consumption and output;
they merely reallocate existing consumption goods through taxes and transfers. Importantly,
the net present value of the transfer payments is not exogenous to the model, but rather
is determined in general equilibrium, since the value of the ﬁrm and the necessary transfer
2payments to prevent liquidation are endogenous to the model.
Within such a neoclassical framework optimal taxation balances two aspects.
On the one hand, the usual labor tax smoothing argument (see e.g. Barro (1979)) implies
a constant tax rate, irrespective of current economic conditions. Indeed, a ﬁrst result states
that if one were to ignore the endogeneity of transfer payments, then the optimal tax rate
within the model should be constant. This result is reminiscent of Lucas and Stokey (1983),
who ﬁnd that in the presence of complete markets and constant government expenditure
(government expenditure is set to zero in the present model), optimal tax rates are constant.
On the other hand, inside the model countercyclical ﬁscal policy (raising tax rates in
good times and lowering them in bad times) can help boost output, the demand for ﬁnancial
services and accordingly the value of the representative ﬁrm in bad times. In turn, increasing
the ﬁrm’s value in bad times can lower the amount of transfers that are required to salvage
the ﬁrm, and can lead to a lower overall net present value of required (distortionary) taxes.
The main insight of the proposed neoclassical model is that the trade-oﬀ between smooth-
ing tax distortions and reducing the net present value of transfers implies procyclical taxes.
Speciﬁcally, optimal taxes are a non-decreasing function of total factor productivity. An
additional result of theoretical interest is that optimal tax rates are history dependent de-
spite (dynamically) complete markets; tax rates at some time t do not only depend on the
productivity level at time t, but are also a non-decreasing function of past transfer payments.
This result contrasts with Lucas and Stokey (1983), where tax rates are history independent,
when government expenditure is Markovian.
The analysis is related to two strands of the literature. The ﬁrst strand uses continuous
time ﬁnance techniques to price government guarantees as contingent claims1. In this liter-
ature, the stochastic discount factor is taken as given, and the issue of how the government
should raise the revenue to pay for the guarantees is not considered. By contrast, in the
present framework the endogeneity of the stochastic discount factor and the optimal way to
1A representative sample of papers in this literature includes Merton (1978), Ronn and Verma (1986),
Lucas and McDonald (2006), Panageas (2008), Pennacchi and Lewis (1994).
3ﬁnance these guarantees are explicitly taken into account. The second strand of the literature
studies optimal (labor-distortionary) taxation2. This literature is mostly considered with the
optimal timing of taxes in the presence of exogenous expenditures. As mentioned above, the
distinguishing feature of the present paper is that taxes are raised in order to ﬁnance en-
dogenous transfer payments rather than exogenous government expenditures. Karantounias
et al. (2008) also obtain history dependence of the optimal tax rate in a framework involv-
ing complete markets. However, their results are driven by fears of model mis-speciﬁcation
rather than endogenous transfers.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the problem of the
government. Section 3 derives the optimal taxation policy. Section 4 considers additional
forms of funding government transfers and derives the process of optimal debt holdings.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Consumers, ﬁrms and assets
The representative consumer has preferences given by
E0













where ct is an adapted consumption process, and ht denotes hours worked, ρ > 0 is the
subjective discount rate, and φ > 0, φ  = 1 controls the elasticity of labor supply. The rep-
resentative agent’s endowment of hours is normalized to one. Speciﬁcation (1) is attractive,
since it allows hours to be stationary in the long run, while keeping the utility of consumption
and leisure separable.
Firms in the economy are competitive and fall into two groups: Non-ﬁnancial (NF)
and ﬁnancial (F). Within each group all ﬁrms are identical, so that one can speak of a
2A representative sample of papers in this literature includes Barro (1979),Lucas and Stokey (1983),
Aiyagari et al. (2002), Angeletos (2002).
4single representative ﬁnancial and a single non-ﬁnancial ﬁrm. The services produced by
the representative ﬁnancial ﬁrm are used by the non-ﬁnancial ﬁrm as intermediate goods.
Speciﬁcally, the non-ﬁnancial ﬁrm is the sole producer of consumption goods and it utilizes
the production function
Yt = Zt (Ft)
1−α (ht)
α , (2)
where Ft denotes the amount of ﬁnancial services, ht the hours worked, α ∈ (0,1) controls




= µdt + σdBt. (3)
The parameters µ > 0 and σ > 0 control the drift and the volatility of the geometric
brownian motion and satisfy µ − σ2
2 > 0. The price of a unit of ﬁnancial services is given by
pt. Accordingly, the optimization problem of the non-ﬁnancial ﬁrm is given by
max
ht,Ft
Yt − wtht − ptFt. (4)
The ﬁnancial ﬁrm employs a simple production technology. It owns Kt units of capital
goods, and uses one unit of capital goods to produce one unit of ﬁnancial services. To
simplify matters, I follow Lucas (1978) and assume that Kt cannot be accumulated, nor
does it depreciate, so that it remains constant.
Agents can frictionlessly trade a zero net supply instantaneously maturing riskless claim
and a zero net supply3 claim that pays Zt as a dividend. Dynamic trading of these two
securities in equilibrium4 implies that ﬁnancial markets are complete with respect to the
ﬁltration generated by Bt, and hence there exists a (unique) stochastic discount factor ξt.
Accordingly, the total value of the ﬁnancial ﬁrm’s capital stock, which I will denote as











3By introducing trading in a zero net supply claim paying the dividend Zt, it is possible to ensure the
dynamic completeness of markets.
4See e.g. Karatzas and Shreve (1998), Duﬃe (2001).
52.2 Default and Bailouts
The ﬁnancial ﬁrm is levered; it owes debtholders an amount Lt. The coupon of this debt is
variable and equals the rate of return on an instantaneously maturing risk-free bond.5 The
presence of debt introduces the possibility of default. The modeling of default follows Leland
(1994). If a ﬁrm defaults, ownership of the entire capital stock is transferred to debtholders.
To simplify the presentation, I assume that in the event of bankruptcy, the capital stock of
the ﬁrm is sold by the debtholders to a newly formed set of ﬁnancial ﬁrms that raise their
funds by issuing equity to the representative households. However, this redeployment process
is costly. Speciﬁcally, a fraction δ of the capital stock is lost in the process of redeployment,
so that Kt jumps downward to (1 − δ)Kt.
To simplify the analysis further, I assume that debt includes a protective covenant that
allows debtholders to liquidate the ﬁrm once
Wt ≤ Lt (7)
Equation (7) can be viewed as a constraint, that arises naturally in the presence of collater-
alized borrowing.
As in Leland (1998), loan modiﬁcations (principal write-downs, debt for equity swaps
etc.) are not allowed as a mechanism to avoid impending bankruptcy and the associated
deadweight losses. In the real world such modiﬁcations or write-downs are hard to implement
because of various frictions, and that’s why we observe bankruptcies in the ﬁrst place6.
5As Duﬃe (2001), and Karatzas and Shreve (1998) show, the stochastic discount factor in a brownian
ﬁltration model can be written as
dξt
ξt
= −rtdt − dAt − κtdBt, (6)
where (rt) is the equilibrium interest rate, κt is the Sharpe ratio or price of risk and At is a continuous
process of bounded variation. The rate of return of an instantaneously maturing risk-free bond is given by
rtdt + dAt. (In many cases dAt = 0 and the rate of return of an instantaneously maturing risk-free bond is
simply rtdt.)
6As Leland (1998), p. 1219 argues “Repeated restructurings would always take place before default, and
6Modeling these frictions is besides the scope of this paper, since it is inessential for the
optimal taxation results that are derived in the next section. All that matters is that
frictions in private contracting will lead to bankruptcy once Wt < Lt.
Since bankruptcy leads to deadweight costs, a benevolent government may have an incen-
tive to intervene and “bail out” the ﬁnancial ﬁrm. Bailouts are modeled in a way similar to
Panageas (2008). Speciﬁcally, if the ﬁrm is threatened by imminent default, the government
makes a transfer that allows the ﬁrm to pay down an amount dLt < 0 of debt, so that7
Wt ≥ Lt+ ≡ Lt + dLt. (8)
An implication of Karatzas and Shreve (1991) p. 210 is that there exists a unique minimal










Later, I show that if the parameter δ, which controls the deadweight costs of bankruptcy,
is large enough, then an optimizing government will indeed provide the transfers implied
by equation (9). I refer to such a situation as a “perpetual bailout”. For what follows, I
simply assume that the bailout is perpetual and proceed as if all agents anticipate that the
government will provide the transfers implied by equation (9).
default would never occur. As default is not uncommon, this approach is not pursued.” Leland’s observation
applies to a wide class of models, including the present one. If debt renegotiation were frictionless, there
should never be any bankruptcies, since bankruptcy costs reduce the joint surplus of all claimholders. The
fact that we do observe bankruptcies implies that various frictions that are not explicitly modeled here (e.g.
hold up problems created by diﬀerent seniority of the tranches, asymetric information about the long-run
prospects of the ﬁrm etc.) can lead to failure of negotiations between the various claimants.
7This speciﬁcation of the transfer and its use to reduce debt is stylized, but could be easily relaxed without
changing the main insights of the analysis. For instance, replacing a fraction of the fair-market-rate loans
to the private sector with below-market-rate loans to the government is equivalent to a government transfer
whose value dLt is equal to the diﬀerence in the economic value of the two loans.
72.3 Taxes to ﬁnance the bailout
The government needs to raise taxes in order to ﬁnance the transfers to the ﬁrm. Taxation
is distortionary and the only source of funding for the government is labor income taxation.
This simple assumption allows a comparison with the results in Lucas and Stokey (1983).
Later, I enrich the model and consider what happens when the government can obtain
a fraction of company stock, or a fraction of the ﬁrm’s assets (or both) in exchange for
providing the associated transfers.
Speciﬁcally, the government levies a (proportional) labor tax on workers. This tax raises
a revenue given by τtwtht at time t. For simplicity, there are no government expenditures
and no initial debt. Hence taxes or raised only in order to ﬁnance the transfers to the ﬁrm.
Given the above assumptions, and recalling that markets are complete and dLs < 0, the








2.4 Formulation of the government’s problem
Given a path of τt, a market equilibrium is deﬁned as a tuple of adapted process for ct, ht,
Ft, ξt, wt and pt, so that














2. Firms maximize (4) over ht,Ft.
3. Goods markets, ﬁnancial services markets, and labor markets clear, i.e. ct = Yt,
Ft = Kt and hours supplied by workers are equal to hours demanded by ﬁrms.
4. All asset markets clear.
8Equation (11) has a natural interpretation. It states that the consumer’s present value
of consumption (left hand side of equation [11]) should equal the present value of after tax
labor income (ﬁrst term on the right hand side of [11]) plus the total value (sum of debt and
equity) of the ﬁnancial ﬁrm which is given by the last two terms on the right hand side of
(11). Observe that the last term in (11) captures the increase in total ﬁrm value due to the
government transfers.
Constructing an equilibrium for a given path τt is straightforward. Attaching a Lagrange
multiplier ν to the intertemporal budget constraint (11) and maximizing over ct,ht leads to






−ρt (1 − ht)
−φ = νξt(1 − τt)wt. (13)
Combining (12), and (13) leads to
(1 − ht)




Turning to ﬁrms, the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to ht and Ft yield
αYt = wtht, (15)
(1 − α)Yt = ptFt. (16)
These are familiar relationships for factor payments when the production function is of
the Cobb-Douglas form. Multiplying both sides of (14) by ht, using (15) and recognizing
that in equilibrium ct = Yt leads to
(1 − ht)
−φ ht = (1 − τt)α. (17)
Equation (17) implies a one-to-one mapping between a given tax rate and the hours
worked in equilibrium. To capture this relationship, let





9denote the tax rate that is required to induce a given value of ht. Straightforward calculations
yield τ′ (ht) < 0,τ′′ (ht) < 0.
Before proceeding with the formulation of the government’s problem it is useful to use
(12)-(17) in order to obtain the present value of taxes and bailout payments in a market
equilibrium. Using (12) and (15) inside (10) and recognizing that in equilibrium ct = Yt



















Equation (20) is a well known property of economies where the representative agent has
logarithmic utility over consumption; in such economies the price to earnings ratio for a















0 if χmt ≥ L0,
χdmt otherwise.
(22)






















where the last equality obtains because mt is a bounded variation process. Combining
(19) and (23) leads to the following problem for a government that is assumed to be providing
a perpetual bailout.
10Problem 1 Let J (Z0,K0;ht) denote the representative consumer’s welfare
U (Z0,K0;ht) ≡ E0






























where τ(ht) is given by (18) and mt is given by (21).
Equation (24) is simply a re-statement of equation (1), using ct = Yt, equation (2), and
the fact that the supposition of a perpetual bailout implies Kt = K0. Equation (25) is the
government’s intertemporal budget constraint, which follows from (23) and (19).
Before proceeding with the solution of problem 1, it is useful to make three remarks.
First, the one-to-one correspondence between hours worked and tax rates implies an
equivalence between choosing τt and ht. For convenience, it is easiest to have the government
choose ht rather than τt. Second, as is well known (see e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004),
Chapter 15), the government’s budget constraint (10) implies the consumer’s budget con-
straint in a market equilibrium.8 As a result, to check feasibility of an allocation, it suﬃces to
ensure that the government’s intertemporal budget constraint holds (equation [25]).9 Third,
problem 1 assumes that the government can commit to a sequence of taxes. However, as
Lucas and Stokey (1983) show, this assumption can be relaxed if the government can issue
contingent debt at all maturities.
8To see this add E0
  ∞
0 ξt (1 − τt)wthtdt+ E0
  ∞
0 ξtptFtdt to both sides of (10) and use the fact that
wtht + ptFt = Yt = ct on the left hand side of the resulting expression to obtain (11).
9Alternatively put, after solving for the optimal h∗
t in problem 1, it is always possible to ﬁnd a market
equilibrium that supports the resulting allocation. (In that equilibrium output and consumption are given




α , the taxes that yield the optimal allocation as a market equilibrium are given by
τ (h∗
t) and the price processes ξt,wt,pt are given by equations (12), (14) and (16), evaluated at Ft = K0.)
113 Optimal taxation
The key diﬃculty in solving problem 1 is the endogeneity of the cost of the bailout, which
is reﬂected in the fact that output Yt and as a result its running minimum mt are aﬀected
by the choice of ht.
To obtain intuition, it is useful to examine what would happen if the government behaved
“naively” and optimized over ht as if mt were an exogenous process beyond its inﬂuence.
In that case, the solution to problem 1 is straightforward. Letting λ denote the Lagrange
multiplier on the government’s budget constraint and maximizing



























By concavity of the objective in (26), there is a unique value h∗ that maximizes (26). Fur-
thermore, the one-to-one correspondence between ht and τt (equation [17]) implies that the
government would end up choosing a constant tax rate. This result is reminiscent of the well
known labor tax smoothing results in the optimal taxation literature (see e.g. Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2004) Chapter 15), and serves as an illustration of the labor tax smoothing
forces that are present in the model.
However, matters are more complex, because a fully rational government takes into ac-
count that mt (and hence the cost of the bailout) are both endogenous. This introduces two
opposing forces: On the one, smoothing the distortions associated with taxation tends to
favor a stable tax rate. On the other hand, lowering taxes in states where the ﬁnancial ﬁrm
is threatened with bankruptcy can boost demand for labor, and hence increase the marginal
product of the ﬁnancial ﬁrm and the value of its assets Wt. In turn this boost in value implies
that the total cost of the bailout may be reduced by “stimulating” the economy through tax
cuts.
12The remainder of this section derives the optimal h∗
t (and hence the optimal τ∗
t ) that
solves problem 1. It is easiest to start by assuming that τ0 and hence h0 is given, so that
logm0 = logY0 = logZ0 + (1 − α)logK0 +αlogh0 is also given. It is also useful to assume
that bailout payments haven’t yet started at time 0






Remark 1 in the appendix allows the government to freely choose τ0 (and hence Y0 and m0)
and shows that condition (27) is always satisﬁed for suﬃciently high values of Z0.10
Next, attaching a Lagrange multiplier λ > 0 to (25), deﬁning




+ λατ (ht), (28)
and observing that the ﬁrst two terms inside the square brackets of (24) are exogenous,












To derive the optimal ht, I ﬁrst derive an upper bound to Φ over all processes ht, and then
show how to attain it with an appropriate choice of ht.
To this end, I consider an arbitrary path of   ht and ﬁx the associated process   mt. By
deﬁnition of   mt,
logYt = logZt + (1 − α)logK0 + αlog  ht ≥ log   mt. (30)
Letting
g (Zt,   mt) ≡ max
ht s.t. logZt+(1−α)logK0+αloght≥log   mt
f (ht), (31)
and








−ρt1{log   mt≤log(
L0
χ )}dlog   mt, (32)
10If the initial conditions are such that W0 < L0, then the initial payment L0 −W0 must be added to the
net present value of the guarantee. Even though this doesn’t change the nature of the solution for optimal
taxation, it does aﬀect the cost-beneﬁt evaluation of the bailout, that is described in section 3.3.




. Letting D(m0) denote





≤ J (  mt) ≤ max
mt∈D(m0) J (mt) (33)





admissible process   ht. Furthermore, the optimal process h∗













denote the unconstrained maximum of f (ht), and noting that f( ) is concave, the process
h∗










t − logZt − (1 − α)logK0)
 
(36)
Equation (36) suggests a simple two-step strategy for solving the government’s problem.
First, determine the optimal mt that solves maxmt∈D(m0) J (mt). In a second step, use equa-
tions (36) and (18) to determine the optimal process for hours and taxes given the optimal
m∗
t from the ﬁrst step. Intuitively, in the ﬁrst step, the government determines a minimum
level of output that it wants to achieve, while in the second step it determines the hours and




t one needs to solve the optimization problem
V (Z0,m0) = max
mt∈D(m0) J (mt). (37)
14This maximization problem shares several similarities with problems of irreversible invest-
ment. The only diﬀerence is that irreversible investment-problems feature maximization over
increasing rather than decreasing processes.













Using the notation  x 






























ϕ1+1du = 0. (39)
Equation (39) has a unique solution and the optimal m∗
















Figure 1 illustrates the solution (40) for values of mt ≤
L0
χ . The diagram is split into
two regions that are referred to as the “inaction” region and the “forbidden” region. In
the inaction region Zt > βmt and hence mt = 1
β min0≤s≤t Zs < 1
βZt or Zt > min0≤s≤t Zs.
Accordingly, it is optimal to set dm∗
t = 0, i.e. take no action. By contrast, if Zt becomes
(instantaneously) smaller than βmt, then it is optimal to immediately reduce m∗
t until the
inequality Zt ≥ βm∗
t = min0≤s≤t Zs is restored.
3.2 Procyclical tax rates and history dependence
Using the deﬁnition of τ (ht) (equation[18]), noting that τ′ (ht) < 0 and using (36) leads to











































Figure 1: An illustration of the optimal policy m∗
t. At point A, Zt > βm∗
t and it is optimal
to keep m∗
t unchanged. By contrast at point B it is optimal to instantaneously decrease m∗
t
so as to move to point B′ and restore the inequality Zt ≥ βm∗
t.
where m∗
t is given by (40) and h is given by (35). Equation (41) shows that the optimal tax
rate can be expressed as the ratio of two state variables, namely Zt and min0≤s≤t Zs.
Inspecting (41), and recalling that τ is a decreasing function, reveals that the tax rate
is non-decreasing in Zt, i.e. the tax rate is higher in times of higher productivity. Figure
2 illustrates the dependence of τ on Zt. When Zt = min0≤s≤t Zs, (i.e. at times when the
government makes transfers to the private sector), the tax rate attains its lowest value. For






The lower panel of the ﬁgure depicts the associated behavior of Yt. For values of Zt such
that τ is increasing in Zt, output remains constant. Output starts increasing with Zt only
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Figure 2: Procyclical taxes and output stabilization
once τ becomes constant. This behavior of Yt is a manifestation of the two forces present
in the model; on the one hand, the government would like to set a constant tax rate for
standard labor tax smoothing reasons. On the other hand however, by making the tax rate
procyclical, the government can stabilize output Yt and accordingly ensure that the value of
17capital Wt does not fall further. This helps the government save transfers to the ﬁrm and
reduce the overall cost of the bailout.
A further and somewhat surprising property of the optimal tax rate is its history depen-
dence despite dynamically complete markets. Equations (40) and (41) imply that the tax
rate is a non-increasing function of the running minimum of output and hence an increasing
function of the total payments to the ﬁnancial ﬁrm by time t (by equation [22]). Alterna-
tively put, ﬁxing a given level of productivity (Zt) at time t, the model implies a positive
relationship between total bailout payments prior to time t and tax rates at time t.
Equation (41) gives the optimal tax rate up to two constants h and β that depend on
the Lagrange multiplier λ. To complete the determination of the optimal tax rate, the next
Lemma shows how to compute λ.
















is contained in the proof of Proposition 2.
3.3 The optimality of transfer payments to the ﬁnancial ﬁrm
Sofar the analysis has simply assumed that an optimizing benevolent government will choose
to extend transfer payments to the ﬁnancial ﬁrm. This subsection shows that this is indeed
the case when δ is large enough.
Equations (36) and (40) imply that h∗




0 ,h]. Importantly, neither β nor h
depend on δ.Accordingly, at any point in time, the representative agent’s welfare -assuming
a perpetual bailout- is at least as large as
Et
   ∞
t
e
−ρ(s−t) [log(Zs) + (1 − α)log(K0) + ψ1]ds
 
, (43)











. Similarly, assuming that the govern-
ment lets the ﬁnancial ﬁrm fail at time t, the representative agent’s welfare is bounded above
by
Et
   ∞
t
e
−ρ(s−t) [log(Zs) + (1 − α)log((1 − δ)K0) + ψ2]ds
 
, (44)







. Comparing (43) and (44) reveals that a suﬃcient
condition for a perpetual bailout is
(1 − α)log(1 − δ) + ψ2 < ψ1. (45)
Since neither ψ1 nor ψ2 depend on δ, and log(1 − δ) can be made arbitrarily small as
δ → 1, there always exist suﬃciently large values of δ that make condition (45) hold.
It is important to stress that re-distribution concerns (which have been ignored sofar)
may have a substantial impact on the welfare implications of a perpetual bailout. In a
representative agent economy, the taxes raised through labor taxation get indirectly rebated
back to the consumer in the form of an increased value of his total (ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial) wealth. In reality, a large fraction of the population has little or no ﬁnancial
wealth and has to rely on labor income alone to ﬁnance consumption. If the government
cares mostly about these parts of the population, then the welfare calculations need to be
modiﬁed. In these modiﬁed calculations, the beneﬁt of a bailout would stem from the fact
that the deadweight costs of bankruptcy reduce the capital stock and hence the wages of
workers.
4 Additional forms of ﬁnancing bailouts and the evo-
lution of debt
Sofar, bailouts could only be ﬁnanced with distortionary labor taxes. In reality, bailouts
are at least partly ﬁnanced by the beneﬁciaries of bailout payments. For instance, the
19government may provide cash injections in exchange for equity holdings in the underlying
company.
Given the stylized nature of the model, which abstracts from capital accumulation, tax-
ation of the existing capital stock in any shape or form is eﬃcient, since it amounts to a
non-distortionary, lump-sum tax. As is well understood in the literature, however, such
forms of taxation can strain the government’s commitment abilities, since typically they
imply conﬁscatory capital taxation at time zero, accompanied by zero capital taxes in the
long run in order to promote capital accumulation.
With this literature as a backdrop, it seems reasonable to place limits on the amount of
tax that can be raised by taxing the existing capital stock within the model. For instance,
such limitations can be motivated as resulting from pre-existing commitments to promote
the capital accumulation that led to the initial capital stock K0.
To be speciﬁc about the limits of capital taxation, this section continues to assume that
the debtholders of the ﬁnancial institution cannot be taxed. Besides the theoretical reasons
laid out above, there are also some practical, institutional considerations, which make this
assumption plausible. If the debtholders are thought of as deposit holders in depository
institutions, then the presence of FDIC insurance along with the possibility to withdraw
deposits on demand and invest them in tax-advantaged forms (municipal bonds, gold bars
in safe deposit boxes etc.) would render deposit taxation practically very hard; in reality
such taxation would induce the sort of bank run that governments try to prevent in the ﬁrst
place.
The sort of taxation that is allowed, however, is taxation of the equityholders. Speciﬁcally,
this section allows for the possibility that part of the funds needed for the bailout may be
raised by having the government obtain either a) a fraction π1 ≥ 0 of the equities of the
ﬁnancial ﬁrm and/or b) a share π2 ≥ 0 of the revenues of the representative ﬁnancial ﬁrm.
The motivation for considering equities and revenue fractions as two alternative forms for
raising funds is based on proposals put forth during the crisis to fund part of the cost of
bailouts by either diluting current shareholders, or by placing some of the troubled assets in
20the hands of the government (or in a government-sponsored “bad bank”). Since the goal of

























ξtdLt, ζ ∈ (0,1). (47)
In equation (47), ζ is the fraction of the bailout that can be ﬁnanced by taxation of
the equity holders. Speciﬁcation (47) is attractive, because it ensures that the value of




ξ0dLt ≥ 0, and hence it implies allocations that
are compatible with limited liability of equity. Moreover, values of ζ smaller than one can
be motivated by the need to provide appropriate continuation incentives to managers and
workers, who may be holding deferred compensation in the form of equities.



















Since labor taxes are distortionary, (49) will hold with equality at the optimum. There
are two obvious, yet important, implications of equation (49). First, obtaining a share of
11To see that this is the total value of equity, note that equity value is given as the diﬀerence between
post-tax revenue and interest payments. By footnote 3 the payments to debtholders when debt is equal to








ξs (1 − π2)psFsds − Et
  ∞
t
ξsLs (rsds + dAs)
 
denote the total value of equity, using the fact that Lt (rtdt + dAt) = −Lt (dξt/ξt − κtξtdBt) (by footnote
3), integrating by parts and ignoring terms having expectation equal to zero leads to (46).
21the dividends or the revenues of the ﬁnancial ﬁrm is equivalent to limiting the cost of the
guarantee and hence the distortions associated with labor taxation. And second, since π1
and π2 do not appear in (49), the choice between taxation of the proﬁts of the ﬁnancial
ﬁrm or the underlying capital has no welfare consequences (since neither the maximization
objective [1], nor the modiﬁed budget constraint [49] depend on π1 or π2.)
The second implication of (49) depends crucially on the assumption of dynamically com-
plete markets. However, if one were to assume restrictions on the ability of the government
to issue debt (say for commitment-to-repay issues), then one form of ﬁnancing may become
more preferable compared to the other. To illustrate this point, the next subsection considers
the stochastic process of government debt under the two alternatives (obtaining a fraction
of dividends or obtaining a fraction of revenues) and shows that in the presence of a debt
ceiling, the latter form of ﬁnancing may be preferable.
4.1 Evolution of debt and debt ceilings






















The next proposition shows that the maximal value of the debt to gdp ratio bt ≡ Bt
Yt
(across all t > 0) is smallest when π1 = 0.
Proposition 3 Assume that constraint (47) is satisﬁed with equality. Then the value of π1
that minimizes sup0≤s≤t bs is given by π1 = 0.
5 Conclusion
The present paper considered optimal ﬁscal policy, when distortionary taxes are used to
ﬁnance bailouts. The key departure from pre-existing literature is that taxes are not used
to ﬁnance exogenous government expenditure, but rather endogenous transfer payments.
22Within such a framework, taxes are not only used to ﬁnance the bailout, but also to
support real activity, raise the value of ﬁnancial ﬁrms and hence reduce the (endogenously
determined) net present value of the taxes required to ﬁnance the transfers. As a result,
taxes turn out to be procyclical. This result is in contrast to a large literature (e.g. Barro
(1979), Lucas and Stokey (1983)), that ﬁnds a constant, acyclical tax rate to be optimal,
when government expenditures do not vary. Furthermore, tax rates are dependent on both
current productivity and past transfer payments. This history dependence of the tax rate
in a dynamically complete market is in contrast to Lucas and Stokey (1983), where the tax
rate depends only on current government expenditure.
An extended version of the model considers additional forms of funding a bailout such as
obtaining equity shares of the company and diluting shareholders or obtaining shares of the
underlying capital stock. In a complete market it is only the total value of these claims that
aﬀects welfare, and not the choice between the two. However, the stochastic process for debt
implied by the two alternatives is diﬀerent. For instance, equity shares may lead to higher
levels of the debt to gdp ratio, which may be unattractive if the government is subject to a
debt ceiling.
23A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The ﬁrst step towards proving proposition 1 is to show that one
can focus attention to policies that set m0 =
L0





Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose otherwise and consider an optimal m∗




Let τL0 denote the ﬁrst time that m∗
τL0 =
L0
χ . Then, by Bellman’s principle of optimality,











































, and it is





In light of Lemma 1, one can set m0 =
L0
χ without loss of generality and accordingly
1{logmt≤log(
L0
χ )} = 1. Letting
η(Zt,mt) ≡ g (Zt,mt) + λχρlogmt,





















12In applying integration by parts, note that
lim
T→∞
e−ρTE logmT = 0,
which follows from the fact that ht is bounded and that limT→∞ e−ρTE minlog0≤s≤T ZT = 0. (The fact that
limT→∞ e−ρTE minlog0≤s≤T ZT = 0 follows from the closed form expression for Pr
 
minlog0≤s≤T Zs ≥ x
 
in Corollary B.3.4. of Musiela and Rutkowski (1998) (p.470) after using integration by parts to compute



















is a constant that
does not depend on the choice of mt>0). Before proceeding, it is useful to prove the following
Lemma.







xϕ1+1 dx = 0. (52)
Such a value exists, is unique, and is increasing in mt.













































0 < h, it follows that ηm = λχρ
1
mt > 0


































0 ) with respect to x implies that ηm (x,mt) is a non-









xϕ1+1 = 0. Finally,
ηm(x,mt)
xϕ1+1 > 0 for all x > x and
ηm(x,mt)






xϕ1+1 dx = −∞. Accordingly,
there exists a unique Z that solves equation (52). Inspection reveals that for m1 > m2,
ηm (x,m1) < ηm (x,m2) and hence Z (m1) > Z (m2). (To see this, note that since ηm is




+ (1 − ht)
−φ
 





and since limht→1 (1 − ht)





= −∞, it follows that limht→1 f′ (ht) = −∞ .














  > 0,









The remainder of the proof proceeds via a veriﬁcation argument; ﬁrst I postulate a























is indeed the value function.
Speciﬁcally, let Z (m) denote the solution of equation (52), and let
ω (x) ≡ Z
−1
( ),
denote the inverse function of Z ( ). Observe that since Z (m) is increasing, ω (x) is also
increasing. Next consider the following expression for the value function
  V (Zt,mt) =
  Z(mt)
0
















t x−ϕ1−1 if x > Zt
(55)
























0 = h. At that point one can
arbitrarily set ηmm equal to either its left- or right-derivative (or any other value) without aﬀecting the
remainder of the proof.





16In the literature G (Zt,x) is known as the Green function, see e.g. Kobila (1993), or Øksendal (2003)
Ch. 9.
26The ﬁrst step towards verifying that   V (Zt,mt) is the value function of (53) is contained in
the following Lemma




t   VZZ + µZt  VZ − ρ  V + η (Zt,mt) ≤ 0 (56)









η(Zt,ω (Zt)) if Zt ≤ Z (mt),
η(Zt,mt) if Zt > Z (mt).
(57)
When Zt ≤ Z (mt) it follows that ω (Zt) ≤ mt and hence
η(Zt,mt) − η(Zt,ω(Zt)) =
  mt
ω(Zt)
ηm (Zt,u)du < 0, (58)
since18 ηm (Zt,ω(Zt)) < 0 and ηm is declining in m. Combining (57) with (58) gives (56).
The second step of the veriﬁcation argument is contained in the following statement
Lemma 4 The derivative of   V with respect to m satisﬁes the following set of (in)equalities




= 0 if Zt < Z (mt)
≥ 0 if Zt ≥ Z (mt)










and using the deﬁnition of G (Zt,x) in equation (55) implies that





























if Zt ≥ Z (mt).
17See Kobila (1993) for some technical details.




< 0, which implies that ηm (Zt,ω(Zt)) < 0, since Zt = Z (mt) if and
only if mt = ω (Zt).
27In light of (52) it follows that Vm (Zt,mt) = 0 whenever Zt < Z (mt). Similarly, when
Zt ≥ Z (mt)















































xϕ1+1 dx = 0 by (52), and ηm (x,mt) is an increasing function









< 1 for all x ∈
[Z (mt),Zt), it follows that   Vm (Zt,mt) ≥ 0 for all Zt ≥ Z (mt).
The rest of the veriﬁcation argument follows similar steps to Kobila (1993), Proposition
6.1. To save space, I simply outline the argument and refer the reader to Kobila (1993) for
additional technical details.




−ρT   V (ZT,mT)
 






















Letting T → ∞, and using arguments similar to Kobila (1993), one obtains the limit





















where the second line follows from equation (56) and the fact that E0
  ∞
0 e−ρt  Vmdmt < 0
(since   Vm ≥ 0, and mt is decreasing). Since mt ∈ D(L0/χ) was arbitrary, equation (59)
implies that   V (Z0,m0) provides an upper bound to any attainable payoﬀ. Additionally, by



















Lemma 5 Let y (u) be given by (38) and β by (39). Then the value Z (mt) that solves (52)
is given by Z (mt) = βmt.
Proof of Lemma 5. By Lemma 2, equation (52) has a unique solution Z (mt).




xϕ1+1 dx = 0 for all mt. (61)






. Next, let u = x
mt and apply a change

























Combining (60), Lemma 5 and the deﬁnition of ω ( ) yields (40). This concludes the
proof of Proposition 1.
Remark 1 The purpose of this remark is to show that supλ∈[0,∞) β (λ) < ∞. To see this,
































By an argument similar to Lemma 2, there exists a ﬁnite value β, such that the right hand
side of equation (62) is zero. Since β is a continuous function of λ, supλ∈[0,∞)β (λ) is ﬁnite.






, then one can guarantee that m0 <
L0
χ is







condition for m0 ≥
L0
χ , it is not necessary.








































The next Lemma establishes two properties of   Vλ (Z0,mt;λ).
Lemma 6 Let B (Zt,m∗
t;λ) ≡   Vλ (Zt,m∗
t;λ) and h∗
t = h∗ (Zt,m∗
t;λ) denote the hours that
maximize (34), assuming that mt = m∗















t) = 0. (65)













t G (Zt,x)η (x,m∗
t)dx. Diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to λ and using the
deﬁnition of   Vλ(Zt,m∗





































Since Zt ≥ βm∗
t, the deﬁnition of G (Zt,x), along with an application of Ito’s Lemma
to (66) leads to σ2Z2
t BZZ+ µZtBZ −ρB = −ηλ (Zt,m∗
t). Using the deﬁnition of η (x,m∗
t)
and applying the envelope theorem to compute gλ yields ηλ (Zt,m∗
t) = ατ (h(Zt,m∗
t;λ))
+χρlogm∗



















































































































Substituting this expression for
dβ
dλ, along with (68) into (67), and recalling the deﬁnition of
G (βm∗









Applying Ito’s Lemma to B (Zt,m∗














































By Lemma 1, m∗
0 =
L0












s. This implies that equation (25) is







This concludes the proof of Proposition 2
Remark 2 Equation (42) always has a solution as long as Z0 is large enough. To see this,
notice ﬁrst that Vλ < 0 when λ = 0 since in that case τ (h(Zt,m∗




























19Panageas (2008) contains a more elaborate proof of the next expression. The reader is referred to that
paper for technical details.











> 0. Since B (Zt,m∗
t;λ)
is continuous in λ, equation (42) always has a positive root for large enough Z0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Reading (47) with equality and using (12), (16) and ct = Yt
leads to
[π1 (1 − π2) + π2]
1 − α
ρ











ξtBt = (1 − π1)Et
  ∞
t













ct can be expressed as
















+[π1 (1 − π2) + π2]
1 − α
ρ


























where the second equation follows from (71). Re-arranging, one obtains
























































where the last inequality follows from i) (1 − π1)Et
  ∞
t e−ρ(s−t) 1






ct > 0. (Moreover, the upper bound (74) is approached arbitrarily closely as Zt →





csdLs > 0. To see this, note that



























































0 is equal to 1, as long





max for value larger than Z0.











csdLs > 0, equation (74) implies that sup0≤s≤t bs is minimal when
π1 = 0.
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